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Professor Cary tells me that you have all received a copy of
my remarks of a year ago so my presentation today will take that
paper as a starting point. I have not changed my mind as to
anything I said then and will today update some of the facts and
intervening events, leaving time for questions and discussion.
Quite frankly, I was among those who opposed deregulation
initially and for what I still believe were the right reasons.
The prior approach to economic regulation of airlines, whatever
its faults -- and there were many -- had built up a strong,
extensive, highly-competitive, and low fare airline system in
this country. It was without a doubt the best in the world and
it offered more frequencies and lower fares by far than anything
in Europe or elsewhere. The major concern about deregulation was
that if the regulatory system were to be changed drastically and,
as a result, the airline system deteriorated substantially, there
would be public and political clamor to re-regulate -- and in an
even more burdensome form. That was the concern originally
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expressed back in 1977 to the Congress by Richard Maurer, now
Vice Chairman of the Board of Delta Air Lines as is set out at
pages 20-21 of the monograph of my remarks last year.
Mr. Kahn while Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board once
said that if the Board got the structure of the airline industry
changed, "you are going to have one hell of a time getting it
back to where it was." At least in that respect he was right.
The domestic U.S. airline industry will never again be the same
as it was before nor can it be restructured to its former con-
dition. So it is too late to talk about whether we should have
deregulation. And while I still believe that intelligent
modification of the old system would have been preferable,
deregulation is here.
My concern now, and that of the airline industry, is that we
do not want re-regulation. We do not want even the seeds of
re-regulation lying around. And that is why the industry is
united in seeking quick abolition of the Civil Aeronautics Board
as well as the statutory provisions pursuant to which it severely
burdens domestic air transportation.
Let me read to you from the testimony of Paul Ignatius,
President of the Air Transport Association of America, as given
to the Senate Aviation Subcommittee just last Tuesday:
"While there were understandable differences of
view within the airline industry in 1978 on the
question of deregulation, there is broad agreement
today -- agreement: that deregulation is a fact of
life; that there can be no turning back to a tightly
regulated regime without completely disrupting public
air service; that the airline industry cannot and
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should not be expected to operate part free and part
regulated; that the economic problems facing the
airline industry over the past two years would have
been much more severe in the absence of the management
decision-making latitude made possible by the
Deregulation Act; and that the time has come to com-
plete the action taken by Congress in 1978 to free the
airlines from unnecessary and burdensome economic
regulation.
"It is for these reasons that the airlines support
the proposal to advance CAB sunset."
And he continued a bit later:
"The primary interests of the airlines concerning
sunset related legislation are:
"To broaden and accelerate the process of
removing unecessary and burdensome federal
regulatory activity consistent with the goal
of Congress for a substantially more compe-
titive, less regulated free enterprise airline
industry;
"To prevent the adoption of new or replacement
economic rules, regulations and regulatory
functions not common to other industries, or
the transfer of such functions to other
government agencies; and
"To assure the continuation of the interline
system under which the full range of in-
dividual airline services and connecting
airline services are made available on a
freely interchangeable basis to the public
here and around the world, through thousands
of sales outlets, on a unique, simple one-
transaction basis."
In short, the U.S. airline industry is anxious to have true
deregulation domestically. We have not had it yet and will not
have it so long as the CAB or a successor agency is around
meddling with management prerogatives and interfering with the
action of the free market.
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Of more direct interest to you, however, is the fact that
U.S. international aviation is not on the block for complete
deregulation -- nor can it properly be. The difference, and the
reasons for it, were summarized by Knut Hammarskjold, Director
General of IATA in his testimony last Tuesday to that same Senate
Aviation Subcommittee:
"Regulatory sunset domestically will reduce govern-
mental control to the minimum required to preserve
essential services. Internationall-, while it is also
desirable to reduce governmental bu. -aucracy to a
minimum, a greater measure of government involvement is
inevitable. It is inevitable because the U.S. has
responsibilties under international agreements and
because foreign nations insist on retaining their
sovereign powers. The national laws and regulations of
each country must be sufficiently compatible to allow
the system to work effectively. One challenge as you
develop legislation for domestic sunset is to ensure
that you do not create serious problems for the inter-
national network."
One thing you as non-Americans can be particularly thankful
for from our last national election is that the new Administration
has a more realistic recognition that bilateral negotiations in-
volve a balancing of the needs and aspirations of two sovereign
states. It is truly a negotiating process. By way of example, I
presume you are all familiar with the CAB's IATA show cause pro-
ceeding wherein it proposed to disapprove the IATA fare setting
arrangements and thus withdraw antitrust immunity from them.
When the matter was recently up before the Board for approval of
a final order in the proceeding, both the Department of State and
the Department of Transportation sent written requests to the CAB
for postponement and deferral of any further action, not only to
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allow the new Administration an opportunity to review the foreign
policy and foreign relations considerations but also because it
was of concern in connection with upcoming discussions between
the U.S. and other countries. This was clearly a recognition by
the new Administration of the desirability of working with
foreign governments to try and resolve differences between the
highly pro-competitive policies of the United States and the
often far less-competitive policies of other countries.
Unfortunately, the Board ignored the requests of the
Department of State and DOT and proceeded to issue its final
order -- merely deferring the effectiveness of its order for some
four months. I may be naive, but it seems to me that negotiating
options are severely constrained after the Board has issued its
final determination rather than before those determinations are
set in stone. (Parenthetically, I might note that all five Board
members were appointed by the previous Administration.)
. I would be very unfair, however, if I did not recognize that
Boyd Hight who was the last Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Transportation and Telecommunications in the Department of State
under the previous Administration, was at least one person who
had a real appreciation for the problems. In a speech entitled
"Deregulation Abroad: A Game Without Rules" given at the
International Aviation Club on November 18, 1980, he said:
"Internationally, it doesn't work quite that sim-
ply, there is no broad international agreement as to
the rules of the marketplace. There are the American
rules, the antitrust laws, and then there are the rules
of other countries or organizations. These other rules
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range from no rules at all to those such as Australia's
maritime regulation of the outbound but not inbound
trades, from rigidly controlled markets in the planned
economy countries to the emergence of antitrust
thinking in the European community. Nobody, however,
has rules like ours. Many other nations don't under-
stand our rules very well. Those of us who have worked
with the antitrust laws sympathize with this difficulty.
Most of those foreigners who understand our rules don't
like them. They believe in market structure, stability
and harmony. That's a wonderful word by the way.
Harmony ... the placid market. The placid market is
achieved by market division and pricing by agreement --
ways of life abroad. Price competition threatens
stability and the health of the enterprise. Without
our experience in the large, unfettered domestic market
with its multiple participants,.our colleagues abroad
shake their heads at our commitment to competition.
They believe either that we are a little bit crazy or,
more likely, that we are trying to open up inter-
national markets so that big American companies can
exploit them. Whatever their view of our motives,
there is no international agreement that competition is
desirable, let alone a body of rules promoting it.
"Moreover, we control only our end of the inter-
national market. We can deregulate ourselves but not
our partners. We can, but it isn't very sensible.
Unilateral deregulation exposes us naked to the ele-
ments. We can therefore deregulate internationally
only by agreement, and only by agreement which arti-
culates the rules of the marketplace."
I think that is as clear a recognition of the need to
negotiate international air transport rights as you could want.
And with all due deference to what Mr. Cohen told you a couple of
weeks ago, it is my impression that the CAB at least, has oper-
ated under the domino theory. That is, if the U.S. can get a
liberal bilateral with one country in one area of the world, the
other countries in the area must of necessity fall into line. It
is also my recollection that Mr. Cohen's predecessor, Mr. Kahn,
in a sunshine meeting which considered route awards pursuant to
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the more restrictive Bermuda II agreement, commented that he
would like to "stick it to the British" and suggested that the
Board should consider encouragement of alternate gateways to
Europe, by-passing London.
As you know, the opening of alternate gateways did subse-
quently occur and, I think it was good for all concerned. For
example, the encouragement of direct service to Germany from
several U.S. gateways, but overflying the traditional London
gateway, had two beneficial effects. First, it freed up seats on
the U.S.-London segment that used to be blocked by thru passen-
gers to Germany and secondly, it resulted in the promotion of
services from non-traditional U.S. gateways direct to Germany.
As Mr. Cohen told you a couple of weeks ago, passenger traffic
between the U.S. and Germany -- already a well-developed market
-- increased substantially. But at the same time the U.S.-U.K.
market increased both in absolute numbers of passenger and in
percentage growth in excess of that with Germany. For the period
v'7
September 197Y through Sepember 1980 there was a growth of
689,300 passengers or 44.3% for the U.S.-Germany market as
compared to 1,653,575 passengers or a 47.2% growth for the U.S.-
U.K. market. What I read from that comparison is that Bermuda II
as it has been expanded and applied is at least as good an
arrangement as the so-called liberal bilateral between the U.S.
and Germany. Furthermore, reference to the tabulations attached
to Mr. Cohen's lecture paper lead me to believe that strong
growth is related to the number of carriers actually providing
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service and points served whether pursuant to a so-called liberal
or a restrictive bilateral. And U.S. participation appears not
so much a function of the relative number of carriers but, rather
the source of the traffic -- i.e., U.S.-originating or foreign-
originating.
I should like to spend the rest of my time updating my last
year's comments on whether deregulation is working.
Just last Friday the Board released a staff study entitle.d
"Developments in the Deregulated Airline Industry." From a quick
review over the weekend, my impression is that it is -- as are
most of the recent studies I have seen -- shallow and self-serving.
I say that because it appears to attribute any positive movement
from 1978-onward to deregulation, yet tempers recent adverse
movements with the assessment that they were contributed to by
industry action that would have taken place even absent the
Deregulation Act.
Now I would be equally guilty of bias if I said the facts to
date prove deregulation is not working. Certainly there are
indicators pointing both ways. Rather, I think all fair minded
observers believe that it will be necessary to wait until deregu-
lation has gone through a full cycle of both good and bad times
before a valid assessment can be made. That has yet to happen.
So the problem today, as it was a year ago, is we still
really do not know. To start with, the facts are not all in, and
secondly, we still do not have complete economic deregulation. I
limit that to economic deregulation because no one has suggested
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-- nor would they -- that safety regulation either be abolished
or wdakened. But in the economic field, we still have the same
burdensome so-called consumer regulations involving denied
boarding compensation, smoking and no smoking regulations,
baggage liability rules, and the like. In his statement to the
Senate Aviation Subcommittee last Tuesday, Mr. Cohen presented
the Board's "sunset" proposal as including:
"transfer explicitly the Board's authority over the
carrier's duty to provide safe and adequate service,
which is a primary source for public protection, to
DOT."
So long as rules such as those are on the books, carrier manage-
ments lose considerable flexibility in running their airlines.
Indeed, if air carriers are like the corner drug store or lumber
yard as Congress has now said they are, the carriers should no
more be subject to such rules than any business concern.
Similarly, while we have much greater pricing flexibility
than we did a year ago, the Board still has a ceiling on how much
no.rmal economy fares may exceed what as commonly known as the
Standard Industry Fare Level. That, incidentally, is quite com-
parable to the so-called Standard Foreign Fare Level by which the
Board manages what it considers proper fares in the international
field. And it is worthy of note that insofar as the Standard
Foreign Fare Level is concerned, the Board allows considerably
greater flexibility on the upside for fares to/from countries
with which the U.S. has so-called liberal bilaterals as compared
to those where it does not. That, of course, is just one example
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of the way the Board brings pressure on foreign nations to fall
into line with its idea of international air transportation
economics.
Now as to the specifics of how domestic deregulation is
working at least to date. I shall cover the points I did last
year in response to the article by James Miller in the Wall
Street Journal of March 26, 1980, namely, fares, productivity
gains, profits, service to small communities, labor, subsidy,
industry concentration, the airline network and safety.
First, fares. A year ago the so-called deregulation econo-
mists were pointing with pride to a lower rate of increase in
fares than in airline costs and consumer prices. As I noted a
year ago, fares were low because the CAB kept the lid on
increases. This year the statement is "... a lower rate of
increase in fares than in airline costs" -- they left out the
consumer prices bit because fares have now risen faster than
consumer prices. But if you look at the General Accounting
office report on the airline industry dated June 1, 1981, you
find that while for the deregulation period (that is, 1978-1980)
airline costs on the average increased more than fares on the
average, for the year 1980, fares increased 29.5% over 1979
levels whereas costs rose only 23.2% in the same period. Quite
clearly, last year's fares rose well in excess of the increase in
costs -- as well they should, because the carriers had to recoup
the losses earlier caused by the Board's artificial ceiling on
fares.
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Next, productivity gains. Last year I questioned whether
productivity gains would not have occurred in any event to meet
sharply increasing fuel costs as would higher average daily
utilization and higher load factors brought about by a temporary
tight new equipment situation. Well, as of today, the equipment
situation is far from tight, load factors have dropped sharply
and the General Accounting Office report summarizes that "signi-
ficant 1978 and 1979 productivity gains, severely eroded in 1980
by declining load factors." As with the situation a year ago, I
do not believe this can be used either pro or con deregulation
because of the concurrent general economic recession in the
United States.
Profits. Last year the bottom fell out and it was probably
the worst year in history for the U.S. air transportation industry.
It was also a disaster for U.S. carriers internationally. The
Aviation Daily's summary of U.S. international airline revenue
and expenses shows a total operating profit for the industry of
$86,428,676 for the year 1979 but a loss of $195,572,273 in 1980,
or a turn for the worse of $282 million in one year.
More recent figures are no less dismal for the U.S. inter-
national air transportation industry, with the first quarter
going from a net operating profit of a little over $13 million in
1979 to almost $111 million operating loss in 1980 and $127
million operating loss in 1981. I must note that I think those
quarterly figures are subject to some correction because they do
not include the results from the transatlantic services of
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carriers such as World or Capitol although they do include Air
Florida. But the trend is there and it is not a happy one.
I guess what concerns me most about Mr. Cohen's presentation
to you of a couple of weeks ago is that while traffic has indeed
grown as he told you, he made no attempt to correlate the traffic
results with the economics of the operation. But my compilation
from the Aviation Daily summary is that over the North Atlantic,
U.S. carriers combined had a total operating loss for CY 1980 of
almost $117 million and for just the first quarter of 1981
(admittedly a low quarter for traffic) an operating loss of over
$111 million. I have no reason to believe that foreign airlines
are any better off and, while in an utopian world with no bar-
riers or differences of aspirations as between nations, we might
accept survival of the fittest, I question whether that can be a
viable approach at this time in international air transportation.
But again, our assessment of deregulation must await further
facts and a full consideration of the effects of the soft economy
on airline results.
Service to small communities. Last year while Miller and
others were pointing to increased numbers of departures and
frequency of service as a result of deregulation, this year the
General Accounting Office tabulates fewer weekly departures than
the previous year for all sizes of communities as well as fewer
available seats. But again one cannot tell whether the reduc-
tions are because of a recession economy or because of carrier
management decisions facilitated by deregulation. We shall have
to wait and see.
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Airline labor. This is a very difficult aspect to assess
for the reason that many airlines have been reducing service with
an attendant layoff of employees. Many of the layoffs are clearly
due to belt tightening in an attempt to become more lean and
efficient -- certainly a laudable goal in any economic regime and
some are due to unbelievably poor earlier management decisions.
Here again it is wait and see.
Subsidy. This may be an argument in deregulation's favor
because the current pending legislation appears to relegate sub-
sidized service to a thing of the past. There will, of course,
be subsidy for service to small communities until 1988 at which
time it is programmed to terminate so that the U.S. air trans-
portation industry will have to sink or swim on its own.
Certainly, it puts all carriers on an equal competitive footing.
Industry Concentration. This, too, is a mixed bag. The
Republic-Airwest merger was consummated during the past year, and
a Continental-Western or Continental-Texas International merger
is at least theoretically possible. And right now Air Florida is
seeking authority to acquire up to 50% of Western Air Lines' stock.
On the other hand, a number of new certificated air carriers
have sprung up under deregulation. These include such carriers as
Air Florida, Midway, Southwest and, within the past year, New York
Air and People Express -- with still others on the brink of cer-
tification -- not to mention the numerous smaller certificated
carriers, many of which were formerly non-certificated commuter
carriers. Several of these new carriers have commenced business
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with small twin-engine jets such as the Boeing 737 and Douglas
DC-9 which have become surplus to the larger carrier fleets and
therefore were relatively inexpensive to purchase. These carriers
neither are unionized -- at least as of now -- nor have they
experienced the cost increases attendant on long term seniority
with the company. If these carriers can avoid unionization and
the necessity of buying brand new more fuel efficient and less
noisy -- but much more expensive -- aircraft, they may be able to
hold their own on a competitive basis. We are, however, already
seeing these newer carriers seeking Government guaranteed loans --
a clear form of subsidy. Again, the facts are not all in and only
time will tell.
Insofar as the airline network is concerned, we are still in
a period of shakedown and do not know what the ultimate effect
will be. It may well be that there is a need for point-to-point
low cost service with no interlining or thru baggage checking. In
mny opinion, however, the maintenance of a good on-line and inter-
line connecting service network is essential. Again, wait and
see.
And finally safety. There is certainly no evidence that
safety has been affected adversely by deregulation and we all
fervently hope and pray that it will not be. My own view is that
the FAA has done an outstanding job of monitoring air carrier
operations and practices to ensure the highest degree of safety.
So long as a strong surveillance continues, I think we are
probably in good shape.
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A year ago I quoted and disagreed with Mr. Miler's conclusion
of May 1980 that: "The evidence thus far is overwhelmingly on the
side of the proponents of deregulation."
This year I agree with the General Accounting Office's
statement that it is too early to judge the ultimte success or
failure of deregulation because it is a gradual process (which has
not yet been completed) as well as with their caveat that their
comparisons "... require a word of caution. They reflect changes
which have also occurred from other than airline deregulation,
such as those attributable to changing economic conditions." So
this year even more would I disagree with any claim that the
evidence thus far is overwhelmingly on the side of the proponents
of deregulation. We just do not know.
I leave you with a thought which I heard expressed on
television by Senator Paula Hawkins, the new Republican Senator
from Florida and a former member of the Florida Public Service
Commission. She said, and I quote: "I rarely agree with
economists. When I was on the Public Service Commission they'd
come to our commission and tell us exactly what would happen two,
three and four years from now. Two, three and four years from now
they'd come back and tell us why it didn't happen that way and
charge us a tremendous amount of money."
In international air transportation it is an open question as
to whether it is in any particular nation's interest to gamble on
the outcome of unfettered competition. Certainly if they are
wrong, the economists are not going to pay damages. The best you
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can expect is an explanation as to "why it didn't happen that way"
-- and they'll probably bill you for the opinion. And so I leave
you with the same thought I did last year. Your government must
ask and is entitled to a definitive answer, "What if it doesn't
work? Is the U.S. willing to pick up the tab?"
